Historical Types of Rationality :: Culture History Essays

ABSTRACT: In this paper we suggest that the contemporary global intellectual crisis of our (Western) civilization consists in the fundamental transformation of the classical (both Ancient and Modern) types of rationality towards the nonclassical one. We give a brief account of those classical types of rationality and focus on the more detailed description of the contemporary process of the formation of the new HTR which we label as nonclassical. We consider it to be one of the historical possibilities that might radically transform the fundamentals of our human world; in fact, this process has already begun. The paper mentions some of the main features of this process, such as formation of a new type of scientific object; new conceptual schemes; new logical and methodological equipment of scientific research; and new understanding of human nature, human mind, human action, and social order. Introduction Approaching the end of our millennium it becomes more and more evident that the modern type of rationality-which has dominated Western culture since the 17th century-is in crisis; that it has reached the limits of its potentialities and something new is being created. We seem to be experiencing the global crisis of consciousness which perhaps concerns fundamental questions of our cultural identity and signals total social crisis of our civilization. This raises a question about the nature of our current cultural this identity: Is it still modern or already "postmodern"? Or are we only experiencing the continuation from classical to modern (Krà ¡l 1994)? Is the crisis of "modernity" a permanent state from which there is no way out and where we can do nothing other than to endure bravely the fate of our time (Weber 1983)? Should we comply with its anamnesis as deconstruction and thus to acquiesce to the extremes of its dichotomies (Lyotard 1993, Derrida 1993)? Or is this crisis someth ing temporary? Should we believe in the future and hope that renovation of the past will take place in our pluralist society (Ricoeur 1992)? Do we face a decisive turnabout consisting in a return to the past, a reevaluation of the Orient and a valorization of ecology (F. Capra 1983)? Should we seek an alternative in glorification of nature and desacralization of culture (Griffin 1988)? Does the way to rescue civilization lead through deliverance of the individual "self" from the oppression of blunt rationality? Or does it lead through enforcement of the principles of fundamentalism whether with a capital "F" (radical, aggressive, insisting on the upholding of the essential articles of faith, e.

Case Study: Ryanair Essay

1) What’s your assessment of Ryanair’s launch strategy? In 1986, the Ryan siblings are getting ready to start competing against British Airways and Aer Lingus on the Dublin-London route. This route was one of the most traveled air routes inEurope, which meant that Ryanair was taking a big risk by deciding to enter this market. At the moment the airline passenger market was a complex one, since the governments would highly control it. Additionally, the airline industry has high fixed costs, which was something that Ryanair needed to take into account if the company wanted to face its already experienced competitors. However the Ryan brothers knew that it was important to fly this route, and so they decided to follow an aggressive strategy: sell cheaper Dublin-London tickets (PRICE). The problem with this strategy was that they did not highly differentiate from their competitors, and as a result a â€Å"price war† took place. By 1989 prices were as low as 70 pounds, and even though Ryanair started flying other routes, by 1991 it seem ed that bankruptcy was around the corner for the airline. The main problem that led Ryanair to this poor performance was that the company’s strategy focused on competing on operating efficiency, without altering its cost structure against experienced and somehow protected companies by some of their stakeholders.The strategy followed by the airline could hardly enhance the â€Å"competitive advantage† Ryanair had (operational efficiency), because at that moment the airline did not have a good amount of customers; andadditionally it did not realize that its competitors could easily reduce their price to the marginal cost, which they were already able to cover. The strategy was not sustainable by any means. Another problem that arise thanks to the poor strategy chosen by the company, was that it did not gave the client a certain level of added value that would be attractive for him/her. Therefore Ryanair lacked a clear competitive positioning, which  enabled a quick retaliation from BA and AL. And as a result, if Ryanair wanted to continue in business, it had to completely change its strategy and revise is goals by figuring out a way in which the perceived added value they could give to the customers was good enough to, later on, capture value from them. 2) How do you expect Aer Lingus and British Airways to respond? Why? Both Aer Lingus and British Airways were already well-established in the Dublin-London route and this route provided a high-volume of business and return on capital, especially for Aer Lingus. But then†¦Ryanair appeared and, as we know, the entry of a new competitor represents an entry price below the market’s price. So now what? What should these two companies do? Aer Lingus and British Airways have two options: either they maintain their current level of prices, or start a price war. In order to decide which way to go, they have to think how costly it would be for them to retaliate against Ryanair’s launch rather than accommodate it. Both companies have a significant disadvantage, they have a cost structure very difficult to cut (staff + accommodation, ground†¦+ selling + handling and catering represents more than 45% of the costs per passenger, approximately 90 £ and they need to add landing fees and oil). As if this wasn’t enough, it is also very difficult to start a strategy based in differentiation because Ryanair, at that time, was trying to offer a service of a similar quality to these companies (first-rate customer service.) Both Aer Lingus and British Airways are supported and hence policies are also controlled by respective governments. Offering low cost airfare requires whole systemic change which is not practically possible just for the reason of retaliating Ryanair. However, these two companies are competitors with deep pockets and there’s a possibility of them driving Ryanair out of business by reducing price to their marginal cost, even if that marginal cost would be higher than marginal benefits. So, considering all of this plus the fact that Ryanair is a very nascent to fully fledged airline service and the very volatile revenues of Airline industry, we think that Aer Lingus and British Airways will not retaliate on Ryanair’s price strategy. 3) How costly would it be for Aer Lingus and British Airways to retaliate against Ryanair’s launch strategy rather than accommodate it? Both for British Airways and Aer Lingus, retaliating against Ryanair’s launch strategy would end in a price war as Ryanair’s only focus is cost leadership. The costs of entering this  price war would be higher than potential advantages. British Airways calls itself â€Å"The world’s favorite airline† – a clear differentiation statement – and has a successful flotation and privatization as one of its mail goals. Entering a price war would show its abilities to fight against competitors, however price pressures can cut profit margins to the bone, especially as the airline might have to face not only Ryanair but more low-cost competitors in the future. Restoring its high fares might result in operating losses. After Colin Marshall joined the company, British Airways focused on satisfying full-fare business customers. If it were to retaliate against Ryanair, it might lose those business class customers and its reputation for safe, reliable flig hts and an outstanding customer service. International journeys accounted for two thirds of British Airway’s sold seats and 90% of its revenue. As Ryanair is focusing on short-haul, intra-Europe flights, British Airways’ focus should be on overseas flights which typically generate more money. British Airways has the advantage of an extensive network and its location at London Heathrow Airport which distinguishes it from Ryanair as a low-cost operator. Exhibit 4 in the case shows that British Airways had  £140.9 cost per passenger. So if it were to retaliate against Ryanair, it would have to cut costs by almost 30% which would result in a harsh decline in perceived value by its high-end customers. If the airline accommodates Ryanair’s launch strategy, it can focus on its differentiation strategy and experience in international flights which makes Ryanair a less dangerous competitor as target groups are different. The costs of retaliation are similar for Aer Lingus. If it enters a price war, it will pro bably lose more money because it cannot even operate profitably with the prices charged above Ryanair levels. Furthermore, it would need high capital expenditures to modernize its fleet. Although it might lose some passengers to Ryanair, the disadvantages of retaliation would still exceed possible gains. The airline’s goal is mostly to promote national interests and be safe, efficient, reliable and predictable. As Aer Lingus can be seen as a public good, it can count on extensive government support. Furthermore, it even has the chance to break even with its diverse portfolio that includes maintenance services and engineer trainings to other services. In order to keep its good reputation, accommodating Ryanair’s launch strategy would be the best thing to do despite potential lost  customers. Aer Lingus would, just like British Airways, be confronted with a tough price war which it can barely win because of its inefficient cost structures and its differentiation strategy appealing to its loyal customers.

Eusmilus - Facts and Figures

Name: Eusmilus (Greek for early saber); pronounced you-SMILE-us Habitat: Plains of North America and western Europe Historical Epoch: Early Oligocene (30 million years ago) Size and Weight: About six feet long and 200-300 pounds Diet: Meat Distinguishing Characteristics: Six-inch-long canines; weak jaw muscles About Eusmilus Even though its technically classified as a false saber-toothed cat, Eusmilus had truly gigantic canines for its size, which at six inches or so were almost as long as its entire skull (when they werent in use, this cat kept its big teeth cozy and warm in specially adapted pouches on its lower jaw, a trait it shared with the distantly related Thylacosmilus). However, Eusmilus also had comparatively weak jaw muscles--with its huge canines, it didnt need to inflict a powerful bite--and it was strangely lacking in supplementary teeth, sporting a relatively paltry two dozen or so. What this indicates is that Eusmilus hunted in traditional saber-tooth style, lying in wait in the low branches of trees, jumping and digging its lethal canines into unsuspecting prey, and then idling its time as its dinner bled to death. Technically, Eusmilus is classified as a nimravid cat, meaning it was closely related to the contemporary Nimravus--with which it competed for prey in early Oligocene Europe and North America, along with yet a third nimravid, Hoplophoneus. In case youre wondering how all of these big-toothed cats could have hunted for megafauna mammals without getting in each others way, the fact is that they didnt: one Nimravus skull bears tooth marks that exactly match the size and shape of Eusmilus canines (however, this particular individual healed from its wounds and lived to hunt another day). We even have evidence for cannibalism, or at least intra-species combat, among saber-toothed cats: another identified Nimravus skull is embedded with the canines of a fellow pack member!